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Abstract 
It is important to be clear as to whether a theory such as evolutionary archaeology 
pertains to biological evolution, in which acquired change is obliterated at the end of each 
generation, or cultural change, in which acquired change is retained. In evolutionary 
archaeology, (1) the population is said to consist of artifacts, yet (2) artifacts are said to 
be phenotypic. Neither (1) nor (2) is necessarily problematic in and of itself, but the two 
are inconsistent, as the first pertains to cultural change whereas the second to the 
biological evolution of humans. A first step to avoiding this problem is to recognize that 
there is a need for a theory of change specific to human culture. Referring to ongoing 
work using a related approach to cultural change, it is suggested that the inconsistencies 
in evolutionary archaeology, though problematic, are not insurmountable. 
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Artifacts undeniably exhibit identifiable patterns of change over time, or ‘descent with’ 
modification, as do biological organisms. The goal behind an evolutionary approach to 
archaeology seems reasonable and straightforward: to develop an overarching framework 
for analyzing how artifacts are related to one another, borrowing concepts developed for 
this purpose in biology such as lineage, heritability, and drift (changes in the relative 
frequencies of different alleles—forms of a gene—as a statistical byproduct of randomly 
sampling from a finite population). This kind of framework would be indeed be of value, 
and those who have striven to go beyond their primary area of expertise to build such a 
framework are to be commended, for it is easy to underestimate the difficulty of such an 
endeavor.  However, much of this literature is riddled with serious conceptual errors. 
Some have been debated at length (e.g. Bamforth 2002; Boone and Smith 1998; Kehoe 
2000; Loney 2000; Lyman and O’Brien 1997; Murray 2002; Neff 2000; O’Brien 1996a, 
b, 2005; O’Brien and Lyman 2004; Preucel 1999; Schiffer 1996; Shennan 2002; Spencer 
1997; Wylie 2000). Others, however, have not been addressed, or require elaboration. 
The goal of this paper is to tackle these errors because, as I see it, they are exactly what 
stands in the way to a genuine theory of how artifacts evolve.  
 
If Artifacts are the Phenotype then Humans are the Population 
Let us jump right in by addressing a glaring problem that comes to light when 
evolutionary archaeologists are charged with not having a clear answer as to what the unit 
of replication is in the evolution of artifacts. Lyman and O’Brien answer that Darwin did 
not know what the unit of replication was when he came up with the theory of how 
organisms evolve through natural selection, so they needn’t be concerned that they don’t 
yet know what the unit of replication is with respect to the evolution of artifacts 
(1998:619). However, Darwin did know what the unit of replication is: the organism. It is 
the unit of heredity⎯the gene⎯that he did not know.  
This lack of clarity as to what is the unit of replication leads quite naturally to a 
persistent error as to what is the population. O’Brien claims “in archaeology, not 
surprisingly, the population consists of artifacts” (2005:30). But this is surprising, for 
earlier in the same paper he wrote: 
 
The only defense that Brew could see for even thinking of using an artifact-classification system 
‘based upon phylogenetic theory is that the individual objects were made and used by man’ 
(1946:55)⎯a point that, to Brew at least, was so obvious as to be trivial. As we shall see, however, 
that point is the keystone to applying Darwinism to the archaeological record. (2005:28) 
 
This leads one to believe that O’Brien’s position is that it is because humans evolve 
through natural selection that Darwinian theory is relevant to artifacts. But in the 
evolution of humans through natural selection, the relevant population consists of 
humans, not artifacts. Indeed this interpretation of his position is strengthened a few lines 
after the statement that the population is artifacts, where he writes: 
 
Evolutionary archaeology rests on the premise that objects in the archaeological record, because 
they were parts of past phenotypes, were shaped by the same evolutionary processes as were the 
somatic (bodily) features of their makers and users. (2005:30) 
 
Here it is unmistakable that O’Brien is speaking of biological evolution operating 
on populations of humans rather than cultural evolution operating on populations of 
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artifacts. Elsewhere this inconsistency appears even within a single sentence, for instance  
“In evolutionary archaeology, the population is artifacts, which are viewed as phenotypic 
features…” (Lyman and O’Brien, 1997: p. 616). To be consistent with the first part of the 
sentence, ‘the population is artifacts’, each artifact must be understood to possess a 
unique genotype, or something that plays the role of a genotype, which gets expressed 
phenotypically. However the second part claims that artifacts are ‘viewed as phenotypic 
features’. How can something be both (1) an entity with a phenotypically expressed 
genotype, and (2) a mere phenotypic feature? One gets the impression that in the second 
part of the sentence Lyman and O’Brien mean that artifacts are phenotypic features of the 
human genotype. But then once again the relevant population is the set of interbreeding 
humans, not artifacts. It is important to see here that the problem is not that they consider 
artifacts part of the human phenotype. That is not at issue. The issue is that the 
framework they are constructing is internally inconsistent.  
 
Why it Matters that Artifacts Inherit Acquired Characteristics 
The confusion regarding the unit of replication and the population are all the more 
problematic because the mechanisms underlying the biological evolution of humans and 
the cultural evolution of artifacts are different, as evidenced by the fact that while 
biological organisms are protected from change accrued during a lifetime (for example if 
one cuts off the tail of a rat, its offspring still have tails of normal length) for artifacts this 
is not the case. Once someone made a cup with a handle, cups with handles were here to 
stay. Indeed in human culture, inheritance of acquired characteristics is not just the 
exception but the rule (though note that here ‘inherited’ merely means transmitted or 
‘passed on’ without implying genetic mediation). Characteristics of artifacts actually 
change faster than the genomes of the individuals who produce them. The mathematical 
theory of natural selection developed to describe biological evolution1 is only applicable 
when there is no inheritance of acquired characteristics (or at least it must be negligible 
compared to change due to differential replication of individuals with heritable variation 
competing for scarce resources), a condition clearly not met in the evolution of culture.  
Since biology and culture are different (though intertwined) processes with 
different underlying mechanisms, it is important to be clear which of them one is 
theorizing about: the one where inheritance of acquired characteristics is prohibited 
(biology), or the one where it is not (culture). The EA literature is rampant with passages 
that reveal a lack of appreciation of this key point. Recall Brew’s objection to applying 
Darwinism to artifacts merely because they are made by humans. What Brew understood 
(either rationally or intuitively), and what O’Brien missed, is that since artifacts can 
change much more rapidly than the genomes of the individuals who make them, change 
in artifacts cannot be explained by recourse to the fact that humans are evolving through 
natural selection. It is important to emphasize that no one disputes that humans evolve 
through natural selection; on this point, O’Brien’s characterization of his critics is 
distorted. No one ever argued for instance that “intelligence and motivation exempt 
humans from the evolutionary process” (2005:30-31) or that “they are not subject to 
natural selection and drift” (2005:31) or that “adaptive plasticity shields humans from 
evolutionary processes” (2005:31) or that “humans can dodge natural selection by 
                                                            
1 This was initiated by the pioneering efforts of Fisher (2930), Haldane (1932), and Wright (1931), and has 
since been extensively developed by other population geneticists. 
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making choices” (2005:31). That would indeed be ridiculous. The argument is subtler, 
and can perhaps be understood through the following analogy. One can use knowledge 
about the wind to make predictions about the speed and position of an unmanned boat 
adrift at sea. But if the boat is manned and equipped with oars or a motor, wind may not 
be the major causal factor determining its speed and position. It is not that the boat is no 
longer affected by wind; it is that some other causal factor is playing an influential role. 
 
Special Laws for Humans? 
EA’s refusal to accept this appears to stem from the unfounded presumption that it is 
incompatible with human behavior as being phenotypic. As O’Brien and Lyman (2004) 
put it: 
  
That artifacts are phenotypic is nonproblematic to most biologists, who 
routinely view such things as a bird’s next, a beaver’s dam, or a chimpanzee’s 
twig tools as phenotypic traits… If the behaviors are phenotypic then the results 
of the behaviors are phenotypic as well. But many of us have a problem with 
viewing human behavior as phenotypic. We see ourselves as being 
quantitatively and/or qualitatively so different from the rest of the natural world 
that we warrant not only a whole new set of laws but also a different set of 
philosophical questions with which to examine ourselves. EA does not accept 
that argument. (p. 179) 
 
Their use of the word ‘laws’ is misleading, as if a phenomenon has to attain the status of 
the ‘law of gravity’ to be worthy of attention. It is ironic though, in a sense, that they 
chose this word, because the subject of law does address an immense body of questions 
and issues pertaining solely to humans. The law does not prescribe rules of conduct for 
rats or rocks. And of course, law is not unique in this respect. At least as many disciplines 
deal exclusively with human affairs (political science, literature, sociology…) as with 
affairs not restricted to the human realm (physics, chemistry, geology…).  
O’Brien and Lyman repeatedly claim that their approach is more scientific than 
alternatives, stressing “Hypotheses derived from theories must have testable implications 
(2004, p. 187).” In arguing that natural selection at the biological level provides all the 
explanatory power we need, we are led to the hypothesis that we make artifacts like 
popcorn makers and Powerpuff dolls because we are genetically predisposed to, and if 
this is born out I will have newfound admiration for this approach. However I suspect 
that, much as physics does not get us far toward an explanation of, say, predator-prey 
relationships, biology will not go far toward an explanation of the design of cultural 
artifacts. 
The indisputable fact is that we are different from the rest of the natural world, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Nothing is gained by letting ideals (concerning the 
equality of all forms of life) obscure the evidence before our eyes that we (for better or 
worse) have abilities other species lack. Considerable effort has gone into attempting to 
explain human functioning and behavior in terms of theories that have proven successful 
for explaining the natural world. And these efforts have been successful to the extent that 
humans share characteristics with other aspects of the natural world; for example in 
understanding how the eye works or how disease spreads or even aspects of courtship 
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behavior. But these efforts have not taken us very far when it comes to explaining 
characteristics by which we differ from other elements of the natural world. And what 
makes us most unique is exactly that aspect of human nature that is of relevance to 
archaeology: our propensity to not just generate novelty but to build on it cumulatively, 
adapting old ideas to new circumstances (the Ratchet effect). The upshot, as Renfrew 
(1982) pointed out some time ago, is that genetically inherited traits likely play but a 
minor role in the form of a human-made artifact. 
This does not imply that artifacts do not affect biological fitness, or that biological 
constraints do not affect their design. It just means that even if you had a complete 
understanding of biology, and in particular of genes and how they are expressed in 
different environments, you would not have enough information to predict or even 
interpret change in the archaeological record. Moreover, archaeological data may still 
give evidence of phenomena observed in biology such as lineages and drift. But when 
such phenomena are observed they need not be attributed to natural selection. Indeed 
drift and other population phenomena have been observed in a computer model of 
cultural evolution in which neural network based agents (without anything playing the 
role of genomes) evolve gestures through a re-iterated non-Darwinian process of 
invention and imitation, no natural selection at all (Gabora 1995).  
 
Conclusions 
This paper is far from the first to point out flaws with EA. Attacks have come from 
multiple directions, and addressed multiple aspects of its claims. But that does not mean 
that EA is doomed to extinction. Perhaps evolutionary theory does have a role to play in a 
workable theory of artifact change, and the goal of constructing and analyzing artifact 
lineages using concepts from biology need not be forsaken, but it is time for proponents 
of EA to cut their losses and rethink their strategy. 
A first step is to resolve conceptual inconsistencies (outlined above) concerning the 
unit of replication, the population, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and so 
forth. A next step is to forgo that biological evolution can provide a complete explanation 
for artifact change. Moreover, it may be that the cultural process overlying it is quite 
different from how it is now conceived. In the scheme I put forth, the unit of replication 
in culture is the integrated web of memories, concepts, ideas, and attitudes that constitute 
an internal model of the world and how to conduct oneself in it: a worldview (Gabora 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2004; Gabora and Aerts 2005a). Like the autocatalytic sets widely 
thought to be the earliest forms of life (Gabora 2006; Kauffman 1993), worldviews 
replicate through an emergent, autopoietic process, without a self-assembly code (like the 
genetic code), and thus acquired characteristics are inherited. Novelty is introduced not 
randomly but through strategic, creative processes (Gabora 2005). Artifacts mediate the 
process by which ones’ worldview is transmitted, in a clumsy, piecemeal manner, to 
others. One cannot examine the state of a worldview, but much like footprints in the 
snow tell us much about the animal that left them, artifacts tell us much about the minds 
that created them.  
So is the fate of EA survival or extinction? The question itself assumes there are 
only these two possibilities, which is consistent with the Darwinian perspective espoused 
by evolutionary archaeologists, in which only the fittest survive. However, in the 
alternative proposed above, where culture evolves through a process more akin to the 
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evolution of pre-DNA life than post-DNA life⎯a process that in fact violates the 
assumptions that make natural selection applicable to its description (Gabora 2006; 
Gabora and Aerts 2005b)⎯survival and extinction are not the only two possible fates. 
Because uncoded replicators inherit acquired traits, they may either survive intact or go 
extinct, or do something in between these two extremes: transform. EA may have to do 
considerable transforming to stay afloat. But if the missing ‘traits’ are ‘acquired’, vestiges 
of the enterprise as currently practiced and advocated may linger in theories that float 
above it. 
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